Decidable Kripke models of intuitionistic theories  by Ishihara, Hajime et al.
ELSNIER 
ANNALS OF 
PURE AND 
APPLIED LOCK 
Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 93 (1998) 115-123 
Decidable Kripke models of intuitionistic theories 
Hajime lshihara a,l, Bakhadyr Khoussainovb~c~*~2, Anil Nerodeb, 
“Japan Advanced Institute of’ Science and Technology, Tatsunokuchi, Ishikawa 923-12. Japan 
bCornell University, Ithaca, NY, 14850. USA 
‘The University of’ Auckland, Auckland. New Zealand 
Abstract 
In this paper we introduce effectiveness into model theory of intuitionistic logic. The main 
result shows that any computable theory T of intuitionistic predicate logic has a Kripke model 
with decidabIe forcing such that for any sentence 4, 4 is forced in the model if and only if 
C$ is intuitionistically deducible from T. @ 1998 Published by Elsevier Science B.V. All rights 
reserved. 
1. Motivation 
The introduction of computable (alternately, recursive) function theory by Post, 
Church, Kleene, Giidel, Turing and Malcev made it possible to analyse the com- 
putability of mathematical notions and constructions within the context of classical 
mathematics. Quite separately, the constructiveness of algebra was a principal con- 
cern of Kronecker in the late 19th century, and the constructiveness of analysis was 
a principle concern of Brouwer in the early 20th century. Brouwer’s work motivated 
the definition of first order intuitionistic logic as introduced by his disciple Heyting. 
Kroneckerian field theory was reworked as computable field theory by Friielich and 
Shepherdson in the 1950s [4]. Systematic study of recursive algebra and recursive 
models of classical predicate logic was initiated by Rabin [l l] and Malcev [8] in the 
1960s. In the 197Os, Ershov’s school in Russia and Nerode’s school in the United 
States began the systematic use of the priority method to determine whether or not 
classical constructions can be made computable throughout mathematics, in such areas 
as vector spaces, orderings, boolean algebras, abelian groups, fields, rings, and models 
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of classical first order logic. We refer the reader to Nerode-Remmel [9], Hazarinov [5] 
and Millar [lo] for surveys. 
Things are more complicated for the model theory of intuitionistic logic. There are 
several model theories for intuitionistic logic with quite different flavors. One is lambda 
calculus models, leading to the work of Girard and of Martin-Lof on typed lambda 
calculi, or, as Scott has observed, equivalently leading to closed Cartesian categories 
(untyped lambda calculi). In such models existential quantifiers are interpreted as func- 
tionals (lambda terms). A second style of model is Kripke and Beth models. A third 
is the topological models as introduced by Rasiowa and Sikorski from prior work of 
Tarski, for their early 1950s proof of completeness of intuitionistic predicate logic 
within classical mathematics. 
All these classes of models are adequate to give classical proofs of completeness 
of intuitionistic predicate logic, although the literature is especially opaque when you 
look for the equivalences and proofs of completeness (see the work of Liiuchli and 
also of Scott). There is also a body of work on constructive proofs of completeness of 
predicate intuitionistic logic. These are based on a very careful choice of definition of 
model and a very careful formulation of the statement of completeness. These proofs 
use so-called feeble (in plain English, contradictory) models, see [14], vol. 2. 
What does computable model theory look like for these model theories? Here we 
look only at Kripke models of intuitionistic predicate logic, leaving the others for other 
papers. 
Classical completeness of standard predicate logic can be expressed by the assertion 
that if T is consistent, then T has a classical model. Classical completeness of intu- 
itionistic predicate logic can be expressed by the assertion that if T is consistent in 
intuitionistic predicate logic, then T has a Kripke model J%?. Moreover a single Kripke 
model J$’ can be chosen so that the statements forced in &’ are exactly those intuition- 
istically provable from T. The standard proof can be thought of as a generalization to 
Kripke frames of the Henkin 1949 construction for classical predicate logic, see [3] 
or [12], in which the maximal filters of classical Lindenbaum Boolean algebras have 
to be replaced by presheaves of prime filters of intuitionistic Lindenbaum distributive 
lattices. 
Straightforward adaptation of that argument gives the result of Gabbay [2]: for any 
decidable finitely axiomatized intuitionistic theory T and any sentence 4 not intuition- 
istically derivable from T, there is a Kripke model of T which does not force 4, based 
on an underlying partially ordered set with a computably enumerable partial ordering, 
and such that forcing restricted to atomic statements is computably enumerable. 
Here our main result is that by using a more refined argument we get that any 
decidable intuitionistic theory T has a Kripke model & with decidable forcing such 
that for all sentences 4, 4 is an intuitionistic consequence of T if and only if&Z forces 
4. This generalizes the theorem in classical computable model theory that a decidable 
theory has a decidable model. 
Examination of the proof of that older theorem shows that the crucial observation 
is that a computably enumerable maximal filter in a recursively presented Boolean 
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algebra is in fact recursive. This is not the case for prime filters in computably 
presented distributive lattices such as the Lindenbaum algebra of a decidable the- 
ory in intuitionistic logic. There are generally lots of prime filters that are com- 
putably enumerable but not computable (recursive). So what we do is to locate a 
subclass of prime filters for which, in recursively presented distributive lattices, com- 
putably enumerable implies computable. These are the prime filters P for which there 
is a non-zero element rj +I! P such that every element not less than or equal to $ 
is in P. 
A function is computable if there is a Turing machine which computes it. We 
denote the set of all natural numbers by w. A subset of natural numbers is computable 
if its characteristic function is computable. A set of natural numbers is computably 
enumerable (c.e.) if it is the range of a computable function. We refer to Soare [13] 
for the basic computability theory. We fix an effective enumeration @s, @I,. . . of all 
computable partial functions. We call number x an index of GX,. We also use the 
i-notation for functions. 
2. Decidable Kripke models 
Let L=(P,“o ,..., P: . . . . CO,C] , . . .) be a countable first order language without any 
function symbols. We suppose that the language L is computable, that is the set of 
constants C = {CO, cl,. . .} and the function n + Ilk are computable. We denote the set 
of all sentences of L by S(L). 
Definition 2.1. A theory is a consistent set of sentences closed under the deduction 
rules of intuitionistic logic. 
Here is the Kripke model semantics. A frame is a triple F = (W, d,D) consist- 
ing of a non-empty set W (“states of knowledge” or “forcing conditions”), a partial 
order d of W, and a map D which assigns to every w E W a set D(w) such that 
u < w implies D(u) 2 D(w). D is called the domain function. The partially ordered 
set (W, < ) is called the base of the frame. Let L(w) be the extension of predicate 
logic language L obtained by adding to L a constant (name) c, for each element 
a E D(w). 
We suppose given a mapping V, called a valuation, which assigns to each pair 
consisting of a w and an n-ary predicate symbol P (resp. constant c) from L, a n-ary 
relation on D(w) (resp. element of D(w)). Let A(w) be the set of all atomic statements 
of language L(w) (classically) true in D(w) under the valuation V. Suppose that for all 
II< w the set of all atomic sentences from A(u) is a subset of ,4(w). Then the 4-tuple 
.M = ( W, <, D, V) is called a Kripke model (over frame F). 
Definition 2.2. Let (W, <, D, V) be a Kripke model of language L, w be in W and 
$J be a sentence from L(w). We give a definition of w forces 4 by induction on the 
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complexity of I$. 
1. For atomic sentences 4, w forces C$ iff 4 E ,4(w). 
2. w forces C#J -+ $ iff for all u > w, u forces Cp implies u forces *. 
3. w forces 74 iff for all v 3 w, v does not force 4. 
4. w forces VX~ iff for all UB w and all constants c E L(v), v forces 4(c). 
5. w forces 3x4 iff for some cEL(w), w forces 4(c). 
6. w forces 4 V $ jff w forces 4 or w forces $I. 
7. w forces $&II/ iff w forces + and w forces $. 
We say that & forces a sentence 4 of language L if every w E W forces 4. By 
induction on the length of sentences C$ E L(w), we can prove that if w forces 4 and 
v>w, then v forces 4. Following the lines of Henkin’s proof for classical logic, one 
can prove the classical completeness of intuitionistic logic. 
Theorem 2.1. For any intuitionistically consistent theory T of language L, there ex- 
ists a Kripke model A? such that for all 4, A! f orces C$ if and only if 4 is deducible 
from T. 
To motivate our next notions we need to expand on the classical proof of this 
theorem. Exact proofs can be found in [3] or [12]. The proof is based on construct- 
ing so-called “prime theories” containing T. These are theories in languages obtained 
by adding to the original L infinitely many new constant symbols. Informally, these 
theories are the “prime filters with witnesses” of the distributive lattice which is the 
Lindenbaum algebra defined by intuitionistic deducibility in T. The base of the de- 
sired Kripke model is the set of all such prime theories. The ordering is set-theoretic 
inclusion. Thus, one can say that under an appropriate coding of all formulas of the 
expansion of language L by constants, the elements of the base are subsets of natural 
numbers. Thus we are lead to the following definition. 
Definition 2.3. An w-frame is a triple (S, G, 0) with the following properties: (1) S 
is a family of subsets of w, i.e., S c 2w. (2) 2 is the set-theoretical inclusion between 
subsets of CO. (3) D is a function assigning to any p E S a subset D(p) of the natural 
numbers such that D(p) C D(q) if p c q for all p, q E S. 
Now we can define the notion of computable frame. Informally, a frame (S, C, D) 
is computable if the sets S and {D(p) 1 p E S} are uniformly computably enumerable. 
Here is an exact definition. 
Definition 2.4. A computable frame is 5-tuple (S, G, D, f,g) such that (S, C,D) is an 
o-frame, and f, g are computable functions with the following properties: 
1. The set S coincides with {range(Ayf (x, y)) 1 x E o}. 
2. For all x E w, if p = range(Ayf(x, y)), then D(p) = range(Ayg(x, y)). 
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If (S, c,D,f,g) is a computable frame, we abuse notation by omitting mention of 
the functions f and g and simply say that (S, &, D) is a computable frame. We are 
interested in those Kripke models for which forcing is a decidable relation. In other 
words, informally, a decidable frame is one for which there is a procedure which 
applied to any state of knowledge p from the frame and any statement 4 from L(p) 
decides whether p forces 4. Here is a formal definition. 
Definition 2.5. A Kripke model & over a computable frame (S, C, D, f, g) is decidable 
if the set {(i, 4) 1 i E w, 4 E Sn(L(range(Ayf (i, y)))) and range(Ay(f (i, y))) forces c$} 
is a computable set. 
Remark. As it is seen from the definition, a decidable Kripke Model is defined by the 
property that each state of knowledge has a decidable forcing relation, in a uniform 
sense. One can notice, however, that the definition does not require computability 
of the inclusion relation which is a II!-relation. We address this and related issues 
in [6, 71. 
Now we are ready to state our main theorem. But first we need a basic definition. 
A theory T is computable if there is procedure which applied to any sentence 4 
answers if 4 is intnitionistically deducible from T or not. 
Theorem 2.2. For every computable theory T of the language L there is a decidable 
Kripke model A? such that for all $ EL, A? forces $ if and only tf 4 is deducible 
from T. 
Proof. The proof is based on effectivizing the proof of the completeness theorem. First, 
we show that computable prime theories with witnesses containing T exist. The clas- 
sical proofs in [3] or [12] do not construct computable prime theories containing T. 
We give a slightly different construction of a prime theory containing T with an addi- 
tional property that guarantees computability. Here is the crucial definition. 
Definition 2.6. Let $0 be a sentence. A theory r of a language L is L-maximal with 
respect to *O if 
1. r does not contain $0. 
2. For all C#J, if C$ is intuitionistically deducible from r, then C#J E r. 
3. For all 4 and $ if 4 v II/ E r, then either C#J E r or II/ E r. 
4. For all formulas 4(x) of one free variable x, if 3x&x) E r, then 4(c) E r for some 
constant c EL. 
5. For all 4, if $,-, cannot be deduced from r U { c#I}, then C$ E r. 
The last condition is the new one and is not in [3, 121. From the first and the second 
conditions it follows that if T is L-maximal with respect to $0, then T is consistent. 
Lemma 2.1. Suppose that T is a computable theory in language L and that $0 is not 
intuitionisticully deducible from T. Let L = L u C where C is an injinite computuble 
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set of constants uch that L f~ C = 0. Then there is a i-maximal computable theory 
I’ with respect o $0 such that T cr. 
Proof. Let 40, 4,) 42, . . . be a computable sequence of all sentences of the language 
i in which every sentence appears infinitely many times. We construct r by stages. 
At stage t + 1 we define r,+i such that r, C Tl+i. At the end we put r = U, r,. At 
each stage t + 1 we treat the sentence &. If we do not put & into Tt+l, then 4 
will not belong to r. Since the procedure is effective, r will be computable. We note 
the following simple fact. If T is computable and A is a finite set, then by deduction 
theorem the closure of T u A with respect to intuitionistic deduction is also computable. 
Stage 0: Iii = T. 
Stage t + 1: Suppose that r, has been constructed. Take 41. We have three 
cases. 
Case 1: +t is A V B. If $0 is not intuitionistically deducible from 4 U {A}, then 
we define r,+i as the closure of G U {A} under intuitionistic deduction. Suppose that 
$0 is intuitionistically deducible from Tt U {A}. Then if $0 is not intuitionistically de- 
ducible from & u {II}, we define r 1+1 as be the closure of r, U {B} under intuitionistic 
deduction. Otherwise, we define rl+l = r,. 
Case 2: & is 3x$(x). If $0 is not intuitionistically deducible from r, U {&}, then 
we define r,+i as the closure of r, u { & 4(c)} un d er intuitionistic deduction, where 
c is the first constant not belonging to r,. Otherwise, we define r,+i = r,. 
Case 3: Suppose that neither of the previous cases holds. If $0 is not deducible 
from c U {4t}, then we define &+i as the closure of & U {q$} under intuitionistic 
deduction. Otherwise, we define r,+i = r,. 
This ends the construction. 
Define r to be U, r,. We prove that r is a L-maximal theory with respect to $0. 
We need to prove that all conditions of Definition 2.6 are satisfied. 
First, we show that $s is not intuitionistically deducible from r. Suppose otherwise. 
Then there exists a t such that $s is intuitionistically deducible from fi+i. We prove 
by induction on k that Ii/e is not intuitionistically deducible from r’. Clearly, $0 is not 
intuitionistically deducible from r,. Suppose that $0 is not intuitionistically deducible 
from &. Consider Tr+i. We can suppose that r 1+1 properly extends r,. Otherwise, $0 
is not inmitionistically deducible from Tt+i. 
Suppose that Case 1 of stage t + 1 holds. It follows that & =A V B and that either 
c+i is the closure of c u {A} or &+i is the closure of r, U {B}. If Tr+r is the closure 
of r, U {A}, then by the definition of r,,,, $0 is not intuitionistically deducible from 
ri+, U {A}. Similarly, if fi+i is the closure of rtU{B}, then t,kO is not intuitionistically 
deducible from Tl+i. It follows that tjO is not intuitionistically deducible from Tl+i. 
This is a contradiction with the assumption. 
Suppose that Case 2 holds. Then fi+i is the closure of r, U {&c#I(c)}. Then $0 is 
intuitionistically deducible from r, u {&, $(c)}, h ence $0 is intuitionistically deducible 
from r, U {&}. This contradicts the assumption of Case 2. 
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Suppose that Case 3 holds, then, similar to above, $0 is not intuitionistically 
deducible from r,+ 1. 
It follows that $0 is not intuitionistically deducible from r. 
We need to show that r is closed under intuitionistic deduction. Suppose that 4 is 
intuitionistically deducible from r. There is a t such that 4 is deducible from r,. Let k 
be such that 4 = & and k > t. It follows that & E r k+i since $0 is not an intuitionistic 
consequence of I-, U {c#Jx_}. 
We now show that condition 3 of Definition 2.6 holds. Suppose that C$V$ E r. There 
is a t such that 4 V I) E r,+l. Since every sentence 4 appears infinitely many time in 
the sequence &,41,. . ., we see that there is a k > t such that +k = 4 V t+b. We need to 
show that at stage k + 1 either 4 or $ enters I’. If $0 is an intuitionistic consequence 
of r; u { 4) and of L” u {I)}, then GO is an intuitionistic consequence of I’, u { c#Q}. 
This is contradiction. Hence at stage k + 1 either 4 or $ enters rk+l. 
We now show that r has a witness property, that is condition 4 of Definition 2.6 
holds. Suppose that 3x&x) E r. There is a k such that & = 3x&x). At stage k + 1, 
4(c) and & enter rk+, for some c new by the definition of the stage. 
Now we prove that if $0 is not an intuitionistic consequence of TU{$}, then #J E r. 
Indeed, there is a t such that & = 4 V 4. Hence at stage t + 1, 4 enters r. 
Finally, we note that r is a computable theory. Take a sentence 4. Find a t such 
that 4, = 4. Then 4 E 1’ if and only if 4, E r,, , . Hence r is computable. The lemma 
is proved. 0 
To state the next corollary we need some more notation. Let Co, Cl,. . . be an infinite 
sequence of pairwise disjoint infinite computable sets of constants. We put LO =L, 
L ,+I =LiUCj. 
Corollary 2.1. There is cm efictive procedure P which, given i E CO, $ E Sn(Li), and un 
index of a computable theory A c Sn(Li) such that $ is not intuitionistically deducible 
from A, produces an index P(i, J/, A) of a computable characteristic function for a 
theory T(i,$, A) which is an L,+, -maximal with respect o $ and contains A. 
Proof. The corollary follows from the observation that the lemma above can be proved 
effectively producing a computable theory T(i, $, A) of the language Li+l when i, $ EL, 
and an index of A are given. In fact the procedure produces an index of the theory 
r(i, $, A). By the lemma the theory is Li+i-maximal with respect to $. The corollary 
is proved. I7 
Now we introduce the desired w-frame F. We give a stagewise description 
of F. From the description it will be clear that F can be made computable (see 
Definition 2.4). At stage t we define a set Fl which contains computable theories of 
language Lt. Say that A’ is a finite extension of a theory A if there is a finite set A 
of sentences such that A’ is the closure of A U A and ‘4’ is consistent. Clearly, if A is 
computable, then every finite extension of A is computable as well. 
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Stage 1: Fi = {r(O, $, A’) 1 $ E Lo is not deducible from A’ and A’ is a finite exten- 
sion of T}. 
Stage t + 1: Suppose that FI has been defined. Then 
Ft+l = (06 $5 A’) IIc/ E WL) is not deducible from d’ and A’ is a finite 
extension of some A E F,} U F(. 
We define the desired w-frame F to be (U Fi, C,D), where D(T(i, $, A)) is the set of 
all constants from L,+i. From the previous corollary and the description of F,, one can 
see that F can be made computable. Thus, the next corollary follows. 
Corollary 2.2. The o-frame F is computable. 
Now we need to define a Kripke model A?’ over frame F. Consider the state of 
knowledge T(i, I+!J, A) from F. For every predicate symbol R EL we set: R(cl,. . ,c,) 
is (classically) true iff R(q,...,c,) belongs to T(i,qG, A). 
Lemma 2.2. Let T(i,$, A) be a state of knowledge from Kripke model JH. Let 4 
and 4’ be sentences of the language Li. Then the following properties hold: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
$-@EI’(i,II/,A) if, and only if, f or all P containing T(i, $, A) the condition 
C$ E r’ implies qS E rl. 
-qb ET(i, $, A) g and only & for all P containing T(i, $, A) we have 4 4 I”. 
4 =Vx# E T(i, $, A) if, and only if, for all P containing T(i, $, A) and c E D(T(i, 
$, A)) we have 4’(c) E r’. 
C$ & 4’ E T(i, $, A) iJ; and only i$ C#I and 4’ belong to f(i, $, A). 
4 v 4’ E T(i, II/, A) iJ; and only if, either 4 or C#J’ belong to T(i, $, A). 
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on the length of sentence (6. If 4 is atomic, 
then we have nothing to prove. 
To prove parts 4 and 5 note that if 4 is @&+” or 4’ V c#I”, then the proof of the 
lemma follows from the facts that T(i,$, A) is closed under deduction and is &+I- 
theory maximal with respect to II/. 
We now prove part 1. If 4 --) fl E T(i, $, A), 4 E r(j, t+V, A’) and T(i, $, A) c r(j,$‘, 
A’), then since r(j, tcf’, A’) is a theory we obtain that 4’ E r(j, (I/‘, A’). Suppose that 
4 -+ 4’ 6 T(i, 9, A). It follows that 4’ is not intuitionistically deducible from T(i, $, A) 
U (4). Hence by Corollary 2.1 and definition of F there is (in F) a computable 
L(i + I)-maximal theory with respect to Cp’ which contains T(i, 11/, A) U (4) but does 
not contain 4’. This proves Part 1. 
Part 2 as well as part 3 can be proved in a similar way. So the lemma is proved. 
17 
From this lemma and using induction on the length of 4, we obtain that in frame 
.A’, the state of knowledge T(i,$, A) forces the sentence 4 if and only if 4 be- 
longs to T(i, $, A). By Corollaries 2.1 and 2.2, we get that the forcing relation in 
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.A! is a computable set. Hence the constructed Kripke model is decidable. Moreover, 
by the previous lemma and the definition of A’, we see that for any $J E S(L), 4 
is deducible from T if and only if 4 is forced in frame .&I. Hence the theorem is 
proved. 0 
Definition 2.7. We say that a theory T is complete for a class K of Kripke models if 
for any 4 not intuitionistically deducible from T, there is a Kripke model A’ from K 
such that .A! is a model of T but not 4. 
The next result directly follows from the theorem. 
Corollary 2.3. Every computable intuitionistic the0r.y 
decidable Kripke models. 
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